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75 Pages
Since September 11, 2001, the environments in which law enforcement agencies
operate have been changing. Contingency theory hypothesizes that an organization adapts
to their environment through organizational structure and contingencies to accomplish a
state of fit or higher performance. Utilizing contingency theory, the study addressed two
research questions: (1) Do municipal and county police agencies believe they have the
necessary resources and training to prevent and/or respond to the next terrorist attack? (2)
How does agency size, structure, funding, and perceived risk influence terrorism
preparedness? A sample of 902 county and municipal law enforcement agencies from the
East Central region of the United States was surveyed. A total of 522 electronic surveys
were sent to municipal and county agencies across 5 states. The remaining 380 agencies
were sent physical survey copies.
The study found that law enforcement agencies believe they have the necessary
resources and training to respond to and/or prevent a terrorist attack. Perceived terrorist
risk was found to be a weak but negative predictor of preparedness. The study concluded
that funding, risk, and structure did influence an agency’s level of terrorism preparedness.

Overall, the contingency theory framework helped explain terrorism preparedness
among law enforcement agencies.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
Since the tragic day of September 11th 2001, law enforcement agencies have been
tasked with the new role of terrorism preparedness. As the probability of a terrorist attack
increases, so does the pressure for law enforcement to be prepared. This is evident with
the sharp upsurge of terrorist attacks around the world (University of Maryland, 2014).
Acts of terrorism have been around for centuries, dating back to the assassination of
Julius Caesar. However, terrorist attacks have occurred more frequently in the 21st
century. In 2013, there were 12,000 terrorist attacks worldwide (University of Maryland,
2014). Due to the increase of terrorist attacks over recent years, it has become vital for
law enforcement to understand what is considered as an act of terrorism.
However, terrorism is hard to define. There are multiple definitions and
interpretations conceptualizing the subject. Research suggests the definition of terrorism
is vague at best (Schmid & Jongman, 1988; Riley & Hoffman, 1995; Ganor, 2002).
Schmid and Jongman (1988) found that survey respondents’ answers generated over 109
different definitions of terrorism. The lack of a universal, agreed upon definition, leaves
police agencies operating under a definition that fits their role in terrorism prevention and
preparedness. A perceived increase in the severity and frequency of attacks, coupled with
a loose interpretation of the term terrorism, has made it difficult to assess whether police
agencies are ready for future attacks. This became evident when police communication
1

and cooperation came under scrutiny after September 11th. There were “turf battles and
the need for jurisdictional supremacy at all levels of the U.S. law enforcement
community”; (Downing, 2009, p.3) which ultimately led to a failure in key law
enforcement functions.
Historically, the role of terrorism prevention and preparedness fell to the United
States government. It was not until the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction
Act of 1996 was passed that state and local law enforcement began to play a vital role in
terrorism preparedness (Combating Terrorism, 2002). By recognizing the need for state
and local law enforcement to assist federal law enforcement, it has become necessary for
police agencies to be trained and equipped with the tools to combat terrorism at the local
level.
State and local law enforcement agencies have recently been propelled into the
media limelight due to the military type of weaponry they have been seen using during
recent altercations between police and the public. It has brought forth many questions
regarding how police agencies were able to obtain such military equipment. The
Department of Defense’s 1033 Program has provided many law enforcement agencies
across the United States with military equipment at little to no cost to the local agency
(Else, 2014). Even though the 1033 Program has been the main source for military
equipment for law enforcement, there has been other federal funding available for
agencies to help them comply with their role in counterterrorism. At the end of 2011, the
Department of Homeland Security paid out more than $2 billion dollars in anti-terror
grants (Becker & Shulz, 2011). To properly acquire and distribute these grants, plans and
policies must be in place for terrorism preparedness to be effective.
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Planning is an essential part of terrorism preparedness. Riley and Hoffman (1995)
looked at state and local law enforcement and their level of preparedness. The study
found that only 38 percent of state law enforcement had some type of contingency plan
for dealing with the threat of terrorism. Of the local law enforcement agencies surveyed,
Riley and Hoffman (1995) found that 52 percent had a contingency plan to deal with a
terrorist event within their jurisdiction.
Theoretical Framework
The purpose of this study was to confirm and expand upon recent research on
terrorism preparedness through the lens of contingency theory. Specifically, the current
study determined if the contingency theory framework helped explain the extent to which
law enforcement agencies were prepared for the next terrorist attack. By drawing from
contingency theory, the study helped identify trends within the region and helped
understand how law enforcement agencies prepared for a terrorist attack within their
community.
Contingency theory posits that an organization must adapt to their environment to
survive and achieve high performance (Woodward, 1965; Donaldson, 2001). There are
three core elements that make up contingency theory: (1) contingencies, (2)
organizational structure, and (3) a proper fit between contingencies and organizational
structure (Donaldson, 2001). A balance between contingencies and organizational
structure will lead to a proper fit or high performance. It is important for law enforcement
agencies to maintain a high level of performance to keep the community they serve safe.
When there is a poor fit between organizational structure and contingencies within an
agency, it leads to poor performance which, in turn, could cause confusion or even failure
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of the agency. In other words, when a law enforcement agency is unable to maintain a
high level of performance, it can lead to confusion, misconduct, and poor public support.
There have been many studies that have taken the idea of contingency theory and have
applied it to policing (Langworthy, 1985; Crank & Wells, 1991; Maguire, 2003; Davis et
al., 2004; Davis, Mariano, Pace, Cotton, & Steinberg, 2006; Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer,
2010; Zhao, Ren, Lovrich, 2010; Giblin, Burruss, & Schafer, 2014).
Crank and Wells (1991) and Maguire (2003) found that organizational size was a
significant predictor of organizational structure within police departments. Haynes and
Giblin (2014) expounded on contingency theory to explain how police agencies respond
to homeland security risks within their environment. Haynes and Giblin (2014) found
there was a positive relationship between risk and preparedness. The study also found
that the threat significantly predicted the preparedness level of the police departments
(Haynes & Giblin, 2014).
The current study looked to confirm past research on the association between
perceived risk and preparedness, while determining whether the contingency theory
framework helped explain whether law enforcement agencies were prepared for a
terrorist attack. The current thesis evaluated the definition of terrorism, role of the police
in terrorism prevention, contingency planning, police policies and regulations, police
training, police equipment, and the importance of public support and communication
between local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies.
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Study Objectives
Surveying law enforcement agencies in the United States about their agencies’
perceptions of terrorism preparedness will provide law enforcement administrators data
on what is needed to better prepare for a terrorist attack. A sample of 902 local and
county law enforcement agencies was chosen from 5 states within the United States.
Police administrators of the selected agencies were surveyed during the fall of 2015. The
survey addressed the following questions: (a) Do municipal and county police agencies
believe they have the necessary resources and training to prevent and or respond to the
next terrorist attack? (b) How does agency size, structure, funding, and perceived risk
influence terrorism preparedness?
Contributions to the Field
This research provides vital information in understanding whether local and
county police agencies are prepared for the next terrorist attack. This research allows law
enforcement administrators to identify shortfalls within their counterterrorism
preparedness measures. This research also identifies whether contingency theory helps
predict law enforcement’s terrorism preparedness, as well as, any trends within the
region.
Thesis Overview
In the next chapter (II), a literature review summarized existing research on police
preparedness. Chapter III outlined contingency theory and how past studies have used the
theory to explain police preparedness. Sample, sample size, variables, and analytic plans
were discussed in chapter IV. In Chapter V, the results of the study were discussed. In the
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final chapter, Chapter VI, discussion of the results, and limitations and implications of the
study were presented.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
Police emergency response preparedness is an essential element of the police
mandate. It is necessary that police have a grasp of appropriate procedures in the event of
an emergency. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon, rather one that has become more
frequent. Acts of terrorism can be traced back to the Greek and Roman republics. Some
individuals believe the assassination of Julius Caesar in 44 B.C could be categorized as
an act of terrorism (Combs, 2013). As acts of terrorism have become more common in
the 21st century, the importance of police preparedness has increased. In 2000, according
to the University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database (2014), there were just under
3,000 terrorist attacks around the world. As of 2013, there were 12,000 terrorist attacks
across the word, resulting in a sharp increase (University of Maryland, 2014). This
finding means the likelihood of a terrorist attack has grown over time.
As the probability of an attack rises, the need for state and local police to be
prepared for a terrorist attack intensifies. Davis (2004) found that “few local law
enforcement agencies had experience with responding to or investigating terrorist-related
incidents” (p.13) prior to September 11, 2001. Federal law enforcement agencies were
seen as the main element in terrorism prevention. Following the attacks of September
11th, state and local law enforcement agencies took a more active role in
counterterrorism. State and local law enforcement were tasked with fielding calls and
7

responding to reports of possible terrorist activity in their jurisdiction (Davis, 2004).
Federal law enforcement agencies recognized that cooperation between state and local
law enforcement agencies was a key element in terrorism prevention. However, the
question lingers about the preparedness of the police in the event of a future attack. The
purpose of this thesis was to assess whether municipal and county police were prepared
for the next terrorist attack. Each of these elements is essential for police preventing
another terrorist attack within their jurisdiction.
Definition of Terrorism
The definition of terrorism is nebulous at best. According to Riley and Hoffman
(1995) “there exists no precise or widely accepted definition of terrorism” (p.2). There
are some definitions that “focus on the terrorist organizations’ mode of operation”
(Ganor, 2002, p. 290) and others that focus on motivations and characteristics. Schmid
and Jongman (1988) conducted a survey of the field’s leading academics to see their
definitions of terrorism. Their survey produced over “…109 different definitions of
terrorism” (Schmid & Jongman, 1988, p. 5) and 20 different elements that affect the
definition of terrorism (Schmid & Jongman, 1988). If there is no precise definition of
terrorism, then how can the police be prepared for such a threat? Not all law enforcement
agencies operate under a universal definition of terrorism. One definition of terrorism is
“violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm”
(Riley & Hoffman, 1995, p.3).
The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines terrorism as “The unlawful
use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government,
the civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social
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objectives” (Federal Bureau of Investigations, n.d., n.p.). However, for legal purposes,
the FBI uses the terrorism definition from the United States Code. The United States
Code breaks the definition into 3 different sections: international terrorism, domestic
terrorism, and the federal crime of terrorism. All of these sections have certain criteria
and characteristics that have to be met to be considered to be terrorism. Riley and
Hoffman (1995) surveyed 52 law enforcement agencies about terrorism preparedness. A
key finding of their study was that surveyed law enforcement agencies did not follow the
official FBI definition (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). Agencies were not aware of the FBI’s
guidelines or how the FBI came to their rationale for defining actions of terrorism (Riley
& Hoffman, 1995).
The lack of a universal definition of terrorism can be problematic in police
terrorism preparedness. For example, when a law enforcement agency perceives what
they believe to be an act of terrorism, the information is then forwarded to the FBI.
However, upon further investigation by the FBI, the case is usually “reclassified as
ordinary crime” (Riley & Hoffman, 1995, p. 4). For the purpose of this study, the FBI’s
definition of terrorism will be used because it comes from the United States Code.
The Role of Police
Local, state and federal law enforcement agencies’ roles were altered to
concentrate on counterterrorism due to the events of September 11th. Before the attacks of
September 11th, the roles of the police were to protect the public along with fulfilling
their mandate of policing the dangerous class (Rabe-Hemp, 2014). In addition to these
previous roles, law enforcement agencies are now responsible for preventing terrorist
attacks in their communities, states, and nation. When President George W. Bush referred
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to combating terrorism, he called it the “War on Terrorism.” Many believed that the “War
on Terrorism” was solely going to be a military campaign (Brooks, 2010). Within the last
10 years, law enforcement agencies have increasingly possessed a military appearance
while conducting their policing roles alongside their terrorism prevention roles. Many
agencies have been recipients of military equipment in the name terrorism prevention and
the “War on Terrorism.” Hill and Beger (2009) attributed the militarization of law
enforcement agencies to the “tendency of the state to treat all CTAs [clandestine
transnational actors] as a threat to national security” (p. 28), therefore altering agencies’
roles in terrorism prevention. Today, many law enforcement agencies’ roles are
encompassed under the counterterrorism umbrella.
However, military forces are not always the best choice for preventing a terrorist
attack. Terrorists are becoming more involved in criminal-type activity. This is partially
due to the terrorist organization’s assets being frozen in other countries (Brooks, 2010).
When their financial funds are no longer available, they look to other means to locate
funding for their mission. For example, terrorists regularly utilize black market trade in
the areas of drug smuggling, human trafficking, and arms trade among other ways to raise
funds. Terrorists have also been involved in money laundering and ATM fraud to gather
the necessary financial backing is needed for their terrorist plots (Brooks, 2010).
The increase in criminal activity by terrorists results in “…an increase in police
actions” (Brooks, 2010, p. 115). Law enforcement agencies not only have homeland
security roles now, but they still have their original responsibilities and roles to perform.
For example, police are still responsible for, “…fighting new synthetic drug epidemics
(methamphetamines), managing and helping to enforce sex offenders registries, fighting
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identity theft and computer crimes, and assisting federal officials with immigration
enforcement and investigations” (Council of State Governments & Eastern Kentucky
University, 2006, p. 10). Always having contact and interactions with the community,
local police departments are more likely than federal agencies to gather a greater amount
of intelligence on terrorist activities within their communities. Henry (2002) envisioned a
system that allowed law enforcement agencies to become more attuned to intelligence
gathering. Henry (2002) noted:
Two key elements in successfully exploiting the vast repository of
intelligence information resides in American police agencies, then, are
shifting the police mindset to include the notion of fighting terrorism and
educating police officers about terrorist practices, methods and activities
(p. 325).
Law enforcement agencies are essentially being used to gather intelligence on terrorist
activities. Using local and state law enforcement agencies to gather intelligence on
suspected terrorist or terrorist activity allows the agencies to be out in the community
creating relationships. When the police are able to make relationships with the
community they serve, it opens the possibility that more valuable intelligence can be
gathered. It is important, besides gathering intelligence, that police officers receive
adequate educational training to fulfill their new role in the 21st century. Training on what
to expect and respond to when a terrorist attack happens allows law enforcement agencies
to have an understanding of how to fulfill their new role of terrorism prevention in their
communities. Also, local law enforcement agencies are “expected to develop and
implement their own response plans” (Pelfrey, 2007, p. 314) in the event of a terrorist
attack in their communities.
To create a terrorism contingency plan, law enforcement agencies must determine
the different types of possible terrorist attacks that could happen within their
11

communities. Law enforcement agencies plan for terrorist attacks such as mass causality,
nuclear, chemical and biological, cyber, and power grid attacks within their communities.
Although law enforcement agencies now have the role of terrorism prevention, they still
need to coordinate with other agencies to fulfill their role. Agencies such as emergency
services (fire departments and EMT services), public works, and local offices of Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) are essential for creating a comprehensive and
collaborative terrorism contingency plan.
Planning
Planning is a key element for preventing another terrorist attack in the United
States. Many police departments have contingency plans in place as a result of the events
of September 11th. Contingency plans can serve as an adequate way to determine a
department’s preparedness against a terrorist attack. The purpose of a contingency plan is
“to identify available resources and identify ways those resources can be formed into an
operational plan” (Riley & Hoffman, 1995, p. 26). One element of a contingency plan is
“determining which organizations will bear responsibility for various aspects of
addressing a terrorist attack” (Riley & Hoffman, 1995, p. 26). Another important element
of contingency planning is having coordination and a liaison with other law enforcement
agencies that have other terrorism prevention responsibilities (Riley & Hoffman, 1995).
Riley and Hoffman (1995) conducted a study of state and local law enforcement agencies
about their level of terrorism preparedness. They found that 38 percent of state law
enforcement agencies had some type of contingency plan in place to deal with the threat
of terrorism (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). In contrast, they found that 52 percent of local law
enforcement agencies and nearly 56 percent of state emergency management
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organizations had some type of contingency plan in place in the event of a terrorist attack
(Riley & Hoffman, 1995). Agencies based in an area with a large population were more
likely to have a contingency plan (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). This is understandable as a
terrorist attack is more likely to happen in an urban area where the number of possible
causalities is the greatest. So it is essential that urban law enforcement agencies have a
plan in place in case of an attack.
Agencies are also more likely to develop a contingency plan if the agencies’
jurisdiction houses a sensitive facility or a high-risk target (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). A
sensitive facility is any building that could cause more damage to the surrounding areas.
These sensitive facilities are usually buildings such as nuclear power plants, weapon
facilities, military installations, and energy facilities (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). Riley and
Hoffman (1995) surprisingly found that if there was a nuclear power plant located in an
agency’s jurisdiction, then the agency was likely to have a contingency plan only 50
percent of the time. It is also not uncommon for law enforcement agencies that have a
contingency plan in place to have other agencies review the plan. Some agencies have
more than one agency review the plan to help identify possible problems within the plan.
The most common agency that reviews other law enforcement agencies’
contingency plans is the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). The FBI reviews more
than 70 percent of state law enforcement agencies’ plans (Riley & Hoffman, 1995).
However, the FBI only reviews 47 percent of municipalities’ and counties’ plans (Riley
& Hoffman, 1995). This emphasizes a potential weakness in developing a solid
contingency plan against the threat of terrorism. The lack of review from the FBI, the
leading entity of the preventing terrorism in the United States, on municipalities’ and
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counties’ contingency plans does not set a good tone when it comes to cooperation. State
police have jurisdiction throughout their entire state, but many state law enforcement
agencies are spaced few and far between and have more area to patrol. Once the
contingency plan is in place, then the law enforcement agencies can focus more on their
training. However, for training to occur, there is a need for counterterrorism policies to be
in place.
Policy
Counterterrorism policy for local, state and federal law enforcement agencies are
intertwined. The United States has been developing its counterterrorism policy for over
30 years (Combating Terrorism, 2001). Over the past 30 years, the United States’ strategy
for combating terrorism has been the idea of using crisis and consequence management
(Combating Terrorism, 2001). Crisis management is preventing and deterring a terrorist
attack, to protect public health and safety, to arrest terrorists, and to gather evidence for
criminal prosecution. Consequence management on the other hand is slightly different.
Consequence management provides medical treatment and emergency services to anyone
in the affected area. They also evacuate anyone in the dangerous areas as well as
attempting to restore any government services that were disrupted by a terrorist attack
(Combating Terrorism, 2001). This strategy is available to local and state law
enforcement agencies if the agencies are in need of assistance. Local and state law
enforcement agencies have primary responsibility for managing the result of a domestic
terrorist attack. These agencies also serve a role in ordering restorative efforts after an
attack occurs (Randol, 2013; Shernock, 2009).
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Pelfrey (2010) conducted a study of law enforcement agencies’ terrorism
prevention efforts. He looked at law enforcement agencies in North Carolina. Surveys
were given to law enforcement agencies with questions about formal policies being
drafted about the standard operating procedure when responding to a terrorist threat.
Pelfrey (2010) found that 25 percent of the responding law enforcement agencies had
developed a formal policy on defining the standard operating procedure in an event of a
terrorist attack. It is important for law enforcement agencies to have effective training
procedures that allow officers to operate within the terrorism policy the agency has in
place.
Training
Training has become an essential part of law enforcement’s role in preventing
terrorism. Many law enforcement agencies have incorporated training focused on the
prevention of terrorism. Law enforcement agencies have conducted scenario training to
give officers a real-life experience similar to what they could expect in a terrorist attack.
These hypothetical scenarios help law enforcement agencies pinpoint weaknesses and
possible overlaps in their response plans (Pelfrey, 2010). Pelfrey (2010) asked law
enforcement agencies about their training and whether they have conducted scenario
training before. He found that 37 percent of the agencies had participated in that type of
training (Pelfrey, 2010). He noted that law enforcement agencies were not the only
agencies that conducted this type of training. Fire departments and emergency medical
services (EMS), also took part in this type training. The New York Police Department
(NYPD) developed a training program for their officers that consisted of one day of
tactical role-playing scenarios (Henry, 2002). Following the tactical role-playing, there
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was one day of classroom instruction for the officers (Henry, 2002). In the classroom
portion, the officers were informed about the history and various activities of terrorist
groups. They were also provided with the tactical and cognitive knowledge they would
need to recognize and prevent terrorist plots, like bombings and any type of weapons of
mass destruction (Henry, 2002). The NYPD program is just one program that has been
implemented since September 11th to help prevent terrorism.
Before practical training can begin, there must be an educational foundation.
There are organizations that offer education classes on homeland security, which are
available to law enforcement agencies across the nation. Security Solutions International
(SSI) offers a wide range of homeland security courses and seminars strictly for law
enforcement agencies. The mission statement of SSI is to further “the highest degree of
emergency preparedness for ground, air and sea” (Schreiber, 2008, p. 51). Besides
providing educational background on terrorism, the organization also places great
emphasis on case studies and hands-on training (Schreiber, 2008). Examining case
studies encourages law enforcement officers to figure out and recognize the mistakes that
were made and how they can prevent those mistakes in the future.
Some of the practical hands-on training included conducting searches and assaults
on other possible transportation that could be used in a terrorist attack. Many units have
looked to practice on assaulting aircrafts and trains. By conducting their training on these
types of transportation vehicles, law enforcement officers have a better understanding
how to handle a terrorist situation. For the law enforcement agency to use aircrafts and
trains for training purposes, they are usually in contact with other organizations that have
access to decommissioned vehicles that the agencies can use for the purpose of training.
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The different types of training offered to law enforcement agencies all require some type
of funding.
After September 11th there was a large amount of federal funding available for
law enforcement agencies to use toward terrorism prevention training. Recently, federal
funding has been harder to obtain. An officer in Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office in
Tampa, Florida mentioned that the funding is “still there, but it’s much more difficult to
secure” (Schreiber, 2008, p. 53). Without federal funding for training, law enforcement
agencies would have a harder time conducting the necessary training for terrorism
prevention.
Equipment
In recent years, law enforcement agencies have come into contact with many
different types of tactical equipment. Much of the new tactical equipment has come from
the federal government through government programs that allow transfers of unused
Department of Defense property. One of the most notable Department of Defense
programs is the 1033 Program. The 1033 Program is also known as the Excessive
Property Program. The program was named after a section in the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) of 1997 (Else, 2014). The section in which the 1033 program
was named after states:
Granted permanent authority to the secretary of Defense to transfer
defense material to federal and state agencies for use in law enforcement,
particularly those associated with counter-drug and counter-terrorism
activities (Else, 2014, n.p.).
The program allowed local and state law enforcement agencies to apply to the 1033
program to receive military equipment at no cost to the receiving agency. The only cost
the receiving agency would incur was transportation fees (Elise, 2014). This means the
17

agency receiving the equipment would only have to fund the cost of having the items
transported to their location. Before the NDAA of 1997 was passed, it was preceded by
legislation in 1988 that allowed the Department of Defense’s role to expand in banning
illegal drug trafficking. Following the terrorist attacks around the world and the domestic
terrorist attack in the United States in 1995 of the Oklahoma City bombing; it was
deemed the 1988 legislation was not adequate for the current times. When the NDAA of
1997 was passed, a counterterrorism element was added, as well as making the act
permanent (Elise, 2014).
The different types of equipment that law enforcement agencies are able to
receive through the 1033 program varies. Law enforcement agencies can request anything
from office furniture to tactical vehicles. To receive the equipment the law enforcement
agency only needs to complete a form stating why the specific equipment was necessary
for terrorism prevention or drug prevention.
Other programs allow law enforcement units to purchase the equipment needed
for preventing a terrorist attack. The State Domestic Preparedness Program was designed
to help “prepare law enforcement agencies to respond to incidents of terrorism” (Vardalis
& Waters, 2010, p. 4). Grant funding can help the agency with their counterterrorism
responsibilities (Newman & Clarke, 2008). According to the Center for Investigative
Reporting (CIR) at the end of 2011 “Homeland Security had given out at least $34 billion
in anti-terror grants since September 11, 2001” (Becker & Schulz, 2011). The CIR also
reported that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) “awarded more than $2 billion
in grants” (Becker & Schulz, 2011) in 2011 for terrorism prevention. However, “the
federal government doesn’t keep close track” (Becker & Schulz, 2011) of how the
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agencies use the grant money. Law enforcement agencies seem to most commonly
purchase “gas masks and chemical protective clothing” (Vardalis & Water, 2010, p. 5)
for their terrorism prevention measures. However, law enforcement agencies have
purchased surveillance drones and heavy armored vehicles for their departments with the
money from anti-terror grants from the DHS (Balko, 2013).
Counterterrorism Units
The Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) program in the FBI has been around for
35 years. The first JTTF was created in 1980 in New York City and had 11 NYPD
officers and 11 FBI special agents (Protecting Your Community from Terrorism, 2003). It
was not until recently the JTTF was expanded to include communication with local and
state agencies with federal law enforcement (Ortiz, Hendricks & Sugie, 2007). Before the
communication expansion, sharing information with commanders was problematic
because of security clearance issues (Protecting Your Community from Terrorism, 2003).
Before September 11th, there were only 35 JTTF’s in the United States (Ortiz, Hendricks
& Sugie, 2007). Following September 11th, the number of JTTF’s increased to over 70
operating in the United States (Ortiz, Hendricks & Sugie, 2007). This increase of
participation in the JTTF’s could have been a result of the lack of communication before
September 11th. A study by Ortiz, Hendricks and Sugie (2007) found that of the surveyed
law enforcement agencies, 88 percent of the agencies participated in the FBI’s JTTF
program.
Terrorism can affect anyone on a catastrophic scale at any time. The average law
enforcement officer does not receive all of the training that specialized units do. Many
specialized units receive training from other law enforcement agencies as well as the
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military. Counterterrorism units are among the most highly trained to handle terrorist
situations. These units solely deal with terrorist activities and gathering intelligence for
other law enforcement agencies. However, many law enforcement agencies are unable to
participate in the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), due to the lack of resources and
funding.
Although Ortiz, Hendricks, and Sugie (2007) found there were a large number of
agencies that participated in the JTTF program within their sample, it is understandable
why some agencies, specifically smaller agencies, would not be able to participate in a
counterterrorism unit. Participating in the program requires the law enforcement agency
to have one or more officers solely devoted to the JTTF. This is difficult for some
agencies because of the small number of sworn officers they have in their department. It
also could be that the agency lacks the resources needed to participate in the program.
There are also some criticisms on how the JTTF operates. In Protecting Your Community
from Terrorism (2003), it is mentioned that JTTF’s “involve too few law enforcement
officers and do not draw on the full capabilities that local law enforcement can bring to
the table” (p. 32). It was believed that the JTTF should work closer with local law
enforcement to locate officers who could work in the JTTF for investigation purposes on
an as need basis (Protecting Your Community from Terrorism, 2003).
Public Support
Public support has become a key part in terrorism prevention. If the public does
not have confidence in law enforcement agencies to prevent a terrorist attack, it could
undermine law enforcement’s prevention efforts. Apart from the main goal of terrorists,
causing destruction of key targets, they are also looking to undermine the public’s morale
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and confidence (Baldwin, Ramaprasad, & Samsa, 2008). Public support and confidence
is important to the way law enforcement agencies operate. Terrorism prevention requires
a “balance and precision that inspires the support and trust of the U.S. population so that
local residents will partner with the police in the pursuit of their lawful mission”
(Downing, 2009, n.p.). If law enforcement agencies are able get the communities’
support and have them understand that the agency is operating within the communities’
best interest, there is a better chance the agency can gather more intelligence. This is
important, especially if the community has become a breeding ground for suspected
terrorists. Once the police are able to gain the communities’ support in their terrorism
prevention efforts, it would be more likely that residents of the community would report
suspicious activity in their neighborhoods.
Communication and Cooperation
Besides having a contingency plan, communication and cooperation with other
law enforcement agencies is important for preventing terrorism in the United States. In
1995, when there was a terrorist attack in Tokyo and the bombing in Oklahoma City, the
United States started to recognize there was a need to combat terrorism and that
communication and cooperation between agencies was necessary. These terrorist attacks
allowed the federal government to realize there was an escalating concern and a lack of
terrorism prevention. In June of 1995, Presidential Decision Directive 39 was issued.
This directive gave the responsibilities to federal law enforcement agencies to combat
terrorism, including domestic terrorism (Combating Terrorism, 2002). It was quickly
recognized that communication and cooperation between federal and state law
enforcement was needed. Not only was communication and cooperation needed but it
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was also realized that federal law enforcement agencies were not capable of effectively
preventing terrorism across the United States. In order to address this gap, Congress
passed the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (Combating
Terrorism, 2002). This act allowed local and state law enforcement agencies and
emergency services to be equipped and trained in case there was a terrorist attack. They
were trained and equipped because it was highly likely that they would be the first
responders in the event of a domestic terrorist attack (Combating Terrorism, 2002). In
2001, the Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act of 2001 was passed, which
allowed the federal government to “enhance the capabilities of state and local emergency
preparedness and response” (Combating Terrorism, 2002, p. 4).
Ever since the events of September 11th, police communication and cooperation
with other agencies has come under scrutiny. For example, there were “turf battles and
the need for jurisdictional supremacy at all levels of the U.S. law enforcement
community,” (Downing, 2009, p. 3) which led to a failure in key intelligence gathering.
Now, local, state, and even tribal police are working with federal law enforcement
agencies in preventing terrorism (Wager, 2012). They are now considered “integral
players in terrorism prevention” (Wager, 2012, p. 20). It is essential that “all levels of
government and the private sector communicate and cooperate effectively with one
another” (Combating Terrorism, 2002, p.6).
As a result of inter-agency cooperation, information sharing with one another
increases. It is important that all levels of law enforcement agencies communicate with
each other on the intelligence they gather on suspected terrorist activities. After the
intelligence is gathered it is essential that the information be verified and determined if it
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is usable for other law enforcement agencies. The information holds little value until it is
subject to an analysis and evaluated (Henry, 2002). If the intelligence is considered of
value then the information is passed onto other law enforcement agencies so the officers
can make use of the information. Only then, when information is disseminated to the
officers, “can their talents at intelligence gathering be fully utilized” (Henry, 2002, p.
326). Another type of communication among law enforcement agencies across the nation
is terrorism awareness bulletins. These bulletins are usually read in roll call for officers
preparing to start their patrols. The bulletins provide law enforcement officers with
information to help them recognize possible terrorist activities, as well as current threats
(Henry, 2002). The bulletins also provide information about certain descriptions of odors
that would indicate a possible airborne chemical agent in an area (Henry, 2002).
Terrorism awareness bulletins are not the only approach law enforcement
agencies use to pass along information. There are other approaches that are used to help
information sharing among jurisdictional lines in different states. One program is called
Hampton Roads CRIMES. This program allows law enforcement officers from seven
different jurisdictions to access criminal justice information systems from participating
agencies to view existing records of individuals suspected of criminal activity (Protecting
Your Community from Terrorism, 2003). Another information sharing system is the
Chicago Citizen and Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting (CLEAR) program.
Chicago CLEAR provides information to the users in real time (Protecting Your
Community from Terrorism, 2003). Officers can see analyses of beat-level crime
problems and “online information on offenders, victims, arrests, evidence/property and
similar cases” (Protecting Your Community from Terrorism, 2003, p. 62). There are more
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than 120 agencies in the state of Illinois that contribute information to the CLEAR
program (Protecting Your Community from Terrorism, 2003). Fusion Centers also allow
agencies to exchange information and intelligence with other law enforcement agencies
in the United States (Lambert, 2010). The growth of fusion centers in the United States
shows that “no one police or public safety organization has all of the information it needs
to effectively address crime problems” (Lambert, 2010, p. 2). Counter-terrorism Training
and Resources for Law Enforcement Web site is another tool that allows agencies to
share information (Counter-Terrorism Training Coordination Working Group, 2003).
These programs are allowing law enforcement to share information within their states.
There is a federal law enforcement program currently open to all state and local
law enforcement agencies. The program is called Law Enforcement On-line (LEO). LEO
is a “virtual privacy network that contains significant sensitive but unclassified
information” (Protecting Your Community from Terrorism, 2003, p. 63). The program is
free to all law enforcement agencies. The FBI administers the information provided on
LEO. In 2003, at the time Protecting Your Community from Terrorism was published, the
FBI was conducting a pilot test on a new information-sharing program. The program was
called the JTTF Information Sharing Initiative. The program being tested in St. Louis,
San Diego, Spokane, Norfolk, and Baltimore (Protecting Your Community from
Terrorism, 2003). The JTTF Information-Sharing Initiative is a program where, for the
first time, the FBI is adding investigative case files (up to a Secret classification) to an
information sharing system where local and state law enforcement agencies have access
to them (Protecting Your Community from Terrorism, 2003). Communication,
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intelligence sharing, and cooperation between local, state, and federal law enforcement
agencies are essential to preventing terrorism within the community and the nation.
Conclusion
Law enforcement’s role is ever changing and it now encompasses terrorism
prevention. Many law enforcement agencies are in need of terrorism prevention policies.
Once policies are in place, law enforcement agencies can become more effective in
preventing terrorism in their communities and states. Classroom and scenario training
have proven effective in correcting past mistakes. Equipment for law enforcement
agencies’ terrorism prevention measures is necessary. State and local law enforcement
agencies need to be equipped with the necessary tools to keep their communities safe
from acts of terrorism. It is also important that law enforcement interacts with and creates
relationships with their communities. By doing so, it allows for intelligence and
information to be gathered through members of the community, who are more likely to
witness suspicious activity. As long as the public trusts the police, intelligence and
information will continue to flow. When a police department can adapt to their everchanging environment, the police can better serve the public they swore to protect.
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CHAPTER III
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Introduction
Contingency theory has been around since the 1950s. This theory posits that an
organization must adapt to its environment in order to survive and be effective. The heart
of contingency theory is that a state of fit, described as equilibrium between structure and
contingency, leads to a high performing organization (Woodward, 1965). This framework
was applied to the perception of preparedness of police agencies to handle the next
terrorist attack. Since the dreadful day of September 11th, law enforcement agencies have
taken a vital role in counterterrorism efforts. This chapter will discuss contingency
theory, how it has been applied to criminal justice research, including past studies, and
how it was applied to the current study.
Contingency Theory
Contingency theory posits that an organization rationally adapts to their
environment to accomplish a fit between structure and contingencies. In this model,
organizations that are fit enjoy higher performance, which generates resources and
growth including size, innovation, and diversification. Organizational structure such as
formalization and decentralization are related to contingencies such as size and
diversification. The variations in organizational structure and agency contingencies,
defined as fit, impact organizational performance. Lex Donaldson (2001), author of The
Contingency Theory of Organizations, contended that organizations strive to be fit
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because when an organization is fit, it enjoys high performance, defined as the structural
adaptation to regain fit model (SARFIT). Therefore, organizations need to find a state of
fit between structure and contingency. When organizations are unable to find a state of fit
(i.e., due to the inability to adapt structurally) it is seen as a state of misfit (Donaldson,
2001). Organizations often only stay in a state of misfit temporarily until an increase in
contingency variables, such as new hires or innovations, lead the organization back into a
state of fit with its structure. In this model, organizations are seen as seeking a state of
equilibrium adjusting their structures to the needs of the ever-changing environment. In
other words, organizations have to be able to adapt to “new organizational characteristics
that fit the new levels of the contingencies” (Donaldson, 2001, p.2).
Core Elements
Contingency theory consists of three core elements. The first core element is the
association between the contingencies (i.e., size and diversification) and the structure
(i.e., formalization and decentralization) of the organization. Essentially, when the
contingency variables increase, the organizational structure variables should increase as
well (Donaldson, 2001). For example, an agency in fit performs better which leads to
increased legitimacy and growth, but eventually this increase in growth would require a
change in the existing structure. In this way the structure has to directly relate to the
organization in which it is being applied, leading to the second core element, which is
that the contingency determines the structure of the organization. When a contingency
changes, it causes the organization to change its structure. Changing the structure to adapt
with the change in the contingency allows the organization to operate at a higher
performance level (Donaldson, 2001). For example, typically the United States Coast
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Guard operates under the jurisdiction of the Department of Homeland Security. However,
it is a contingency that in wartime, the Coast Guard may be reassigned to the Department
of the Navy, which falls under the Department of Defense. This is in place to increase the
effectiveness of military strategy.
The final element of the core paradigm deals with whether there is a proper fit
between the contingency and organizational structure. When an organization’s structure
has a good fit with the contingency, it leads to higher performance. If the organization
has a misfit, it will lead to a poorer performance (Donaldson, 2001). An example of this
would be a contingency that was in place in an agency prior to a restructure. The
contingency may call for one department to complete a certain task but the department
may not exist anymore due to the restructuring of the agency. This may lead to confusion,
poor performance, and possibly failure of the agency. A well thought out contingency
will allow an agency to continue to operate, regardless of obstacles they may face, which
will lead to better performance compared to their less prepared counterpart.
Fundamentally, contingency theory speculates that an organization will strive to remain
fit to increase performance when there is a change in the agency’s internal contingencies
and organizational structure.
Application to Policing
Contingency theory has been applied to a few policing studies in the past. Jihong
Zhao, Ling Ren, and Nicholas Lovrich (2010) applied contingency theory to
organizational structures of police agencies during the 1990s to determine if contingency
theory explained the adoption of community policing innovations. They measured
contingency theory through two hypothesized variables: environmental complexity and
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organizational size. The authors collected their data from six principal sources. Their first
source of data was from the Division of Governmental Studies and Services (DGSS) at
Washington State University. The DGSS surveyed municipal police departments in 1993,
1996, and in 2000. Following the data from the DGSS, subsequent sources of data were
collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics covering municipal unemployment data
from 1993 to 2000, Census Reports from 1990 to 2000, and annual finance surveys of
city government, which was conducted by the Census as well. The last two sources of
data in their study came from emails or phone calls of the cities that were in their sample
already, and the amount of money that was awarded to law enforcement agencies through
Making Officers Redeployment Effective grants (Zhao, Ren, & Lovrich, 2010).
The authors’ primary finding was that there had been a very limited change in the
organizational structure of the agencies (Zhao, Ren, & Lovrich, 2010). They did see a
few independent variables associated with the adoption of structural change during the
1990s, such as a 15 percent increase in the number of daytime patrol beats. This increase
was seen in 195 agencies that were surveyed continually over the course of the 1990s.
The study found that the Making Officers Redeployment Effective grant funds and the
indicator for implementation of innovative programs did not show a consistent effect on
structural change in police departments. The researchers found that “contingency relating
to environmental complexity has a key place in research on police organizations” (Zhao,
Ren, & Lovrich, 2010, p.223).
Zhao, Ren, & Lovrich’s (2010) research built upon early police organization
research that explored the ability of organizational size and environmental complexity to
predict structural arrangements in police agencies. For example, Langworthy (1985)
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explored the impact of organizational size and population diversity on structural
arrangements within 176 police departments. Organizational size was an important
predictor of the number of patrol beats, the number of ranks, proportion of civilians and,
proportion of supervisors. Other early studies, including Crank and Wells (1991) and
Maguire (2003) confirmed that organizational size was a significant predictor of
organizational structure in police departments.
Melissa Haynes and Matthew Giblin (2014) expanded the contingency theory
perspective by applying it to how police organizations responded to risks in their
environment to prepare for homeland security incidents. Their research built upon
previous studies that confirmed that police agencies faced with higher levels of risk, a
key external contingency (i.e., risk or crime), are more likely to take steps to be prepared
(Davis et al., 2004; Davis et al., 2006; Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010; Burruss, &
Schafer, 2014).
While contingency theory has not received much empirical support when applied
to community policing innovations, it has received significant support in explaining
homeland security preparedness (Davis et al., 2004; Davis et al., 2006, Schafer, Burruss,
& Giblin, 2009; Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010). This support has been demonstrated
in national surveys, which have addressed terrorism preparedness among local police
departments across the United States (Davis et al., 2004; Davis et al., 2006) as well as
small and large municipal police agencies across Illinois (Schafer, Burruss, & Giblin,
2009; Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010) and in a national sample of small municipal
police departments (Giblin, Burruss, & Schafer, 2014).
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Haynes and Giblin (2014) explored the relationship between subjective and
objective risk factors and organizational preparedness utilizing a contingency framework.
They collected data from a 2011 national survey of 350 small (i.e., consisted of fewer
than 25 sworn officers) law enforcement agencies. The findings of this study suggest a
negative relationship between risk and preparedness. The contingency theory framework
was supported as an explanation for the different levels of homeland security
preparedness in police agencies. Threat was the only factor that significantly predicted
preparedness level within police departments. The study also found that the objective
factors of vulnerability and consequences were not associated with preparedness levels
within police agencies. Objective risks were also found to not be associated with
subjective perceptions. In other words, the preparedness level of the department was not
influenced by the actual risks within the police department’s jurisdiction (Haynes, &
Giblin, 2014). Burruss, Giblin, and Schafer, (2010) found that institutional pressures (i.e.,
organizations conforming to what is supported in the larger environment) were more
prominent than perceived risk measures. That being said, Haynes and Giblin (2014)
believed that objective risk factors could prove irrelevant because all police agencies face
some type of pressure to address and incorporate homeland security functions into their
department. Past criminal justice research has proven that risk is related to how prepared
an agency is. Research has also found that organizational size is an important predictor of
organizational structure.
Application to Current Study
The driving force behind structural arrangements is the external environment
within which organizations operate. The events of September 11th have prompted police

31

agencies to adapt to this new threat by being the front line in anti-terrorist efforts. Their
role is predicated upon their close ties to their community members and the ability to
identify suspicious activities, which may preempt an attack. The pressure for agencies to
adopt this front line role, which comes from the public, as well as federal law
enforcement agencies increasingly rely on local law enforcement to identify, report, and
respond to potential terrorist threats. Agencies have adapted in several different structural
ways, including: the creation and implementation of specialized units designed to gather
intelligence and assess risk, training for line officers in how to identify and respond to
attacks, and participation in joint-terrorist task forces and fusion centers. The federal
government recognized the vital role of the police in homeland security preparedness and
provided the departments with support through the form of external grants. Individual
states also provided grants to police departments for homeland security preparedness
purposes. Agencies could obtain state and federal grants for homeland security
preparedness, but they would also use their own internal resources to increase their
preparedness.
Evidence from contingency theory suggests these structural responses to
terrorism, such as units and specialized training, or participation in joint terrorism task
forces could be attempts to move into a state of fit, which in turn will increase
performance. Many aspects of organizational structure, including environmental
complexity are related to contingencies such as organizational size. Contingency theory
research reveals considerable variations across organization in structure, even for
organizations in the same industry (Blau & Schoenherr, 1971). In other words, we would
have expected considerable variability among agencies and how they structure their
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response to terrorist threats. However, a lack of fit between an agency or organizational
structure and their contingencies (i.e., organizational size) may have implications for the
perceived legitimacy and effectiveness of the agencies’ plans for responding to terrorism.
The goal of this research was to assess the state of fit within the law enforcement
agencies surveyed and to identify trends within the region.

33

CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY
Introduction
Law enforcement terrorism preparedness has become more important now than
ever. Past research has shown that terrorism preparedness is essential to police
operations. For example, in a study conducted by Ortiz, Hendricks, and Sugie (2007), 88
percent of the agencies surveyed actively participated in the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task
Force. With the passing of the Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act of 2001,
local agencies became more involved in terrorism preparedness with the help of the
federal government (Combating Terrorism, 2002). Sharing information with other
agencies has become important, not only in regular law enforcement duties, but as well in
terrorism preparedness. Based on contingency theory, the present study draws upon past
research on police structure and terrorism preparedness, to determine if there is an
association between an agency’s terrorism preparedness in order to remain in a state of
fit. A survey was distributed to county and municipal law enforcement agencies across 5
states, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin. The sample for this study was
902 agencies consisting of 435 county sheriff agencies and 467 municipalities.
The following research questions were addressed in this study:
1) Do municipal and county police agencies believe they have the necessary
resources and training to prevent and/or respond to the next terrorist attack?
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2) How does agency size, structure, funding, and perceived risk influence terrorism
preparedness?
Data for the current study came from a survey sent to county and municipal law
enforcement administrators asking about their agency’s terrorism preparedness. Previous
research provides empirical support for the relationship between risk and law
enforcement homeland security activities (Davis et al., 2004; Davis et al., 2006; Burruss,
Giblin, & Schafer, 2010; Giblin, Burruss, & Schafer, 2014). The current study looked to
confirm and extend past research by exploring how police agencies prepare for terrorist
incidents using the contingency theory framework. The current study looked at law
enforcement terrorism preparedness on a broader scale than previous research.
Setting
The states chosen for this study were Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and
Wisconsin. These states were selected based on the U.S. Census Bureau’s map regions.
The 5 states listed above fall into the East North Central region of the U.S. Census
Bureau (U.S. Census, 2015). Due to the recent publicity of the police shooting of Michael
Brown in the state of Missouri, at the time of this study, the state was excluded from
being used in the sample for fear that it could skew the data. Illinois was of particular
interest as it was the location of the where the study was being conducted from. In order
to exclude the state of Missouri from the sample pool, the East North Central Region of
the U.S. Census Bureau was chosen. This allowed Illinois to be included in the sample
pool while precluding Missouri.
The state of Illinois is home to a population of 12,880,580 with approximately
231.1 persons per a square mile (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015). Indiana has a population of
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6,596,855 with approximately 181.0 persons per square mile. The state of Michigan is
home to 9,909,877 people with roughly 174.8 persons per a square mile. As of the 2014
U.S. Census, the state of Ohio has a population of 11,594,163 with nearly 282.3 persons
per a square mile. Finally the state of Wisconsin is home to 5,757,564 with around 105.0
persons per a square mile (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015). Currently, there are nearly 2,800
municipal police departments operating within Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and
Wisconsin combined (National Directory of Law Enforcement Administrators, 2014).
Selection Criteria
All of the agencies in the study were chosen from the 2015 National Directory of
Law Enforcement Administrators. All municipal law enforcement agencies from all 5
states were entered into the sample pool. All county sheriff agencies from all 5 states
were included in the sample pool. However, all municipal agencies were not chosen for
inclusion due to the sheer number of agencies. Time constraints also played a role in
deciding to randomly select 93 municipality agencies from each state to make up a
sample size of 902 agencies. State law enforcement agencies were not included in the
current study because it was assumed that much of the counterterrorism funding would be
earmarked for the state police. Therefore, they would have the necessary tools to have an
adequate terrorism preparedness plan in place. Also, their inclusion could have skew any
findings of the study.
Sample
There were a total of 2,791 municipal law enforcement agencies in the sample
pool from the 5 predetermined states. The sample size of 902 was desired and therefore
the sample pool was narrowed down using random sampling. The sample size was
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narrowed down to 902 agencies from 2,791 due to the sheer size of the original sample. A
sample of 902 agencies would give a better overall picture of the issue being studied.
Therefore, by choosing a large sample size, there would be a large enough return rate to
improve generalizability of the findings. There were 437 county sheriff agencies and 465
municipal law enforcement agencies selected. The number of county sheriff agencies
(n=437) reflected the total number of counties in the 5 states. All county sheriff agencies
were sampled. For municipal agencies, each state produced 93 municipal law
enforcement agencies through random sampling of each state’s municipal sample pool.
After subtracting all of the county agencies (n=437) there were 465 municipal agencies
left. In order to ensure that each state had an even number of municipality agencies
chosen for the sample, the number had to be divisible by 5. Therefore, by dividing 465
agencies across 5 states, that provided a sample of 93 municipal agencies per a state. The
original sampling pool for municipal and county agencies contained duplicates. These
duplicates were removed from the sample before random sampling was conducted.
Following distribution of the survey, a response rate of 12.74 percent was achieved with
115 useable cases.
Variables
Dependent Variable
In this study, the dependent variable was preparedness. The variable preparedness
was defined as any step taken to prevent or respond to a terrorist act. Schafer, Burruss,
and Giblin (2009) measured preparedness by providing descriptions of steps or activities
that enhanced preparedness and asked the respondents to mark the steps or activities that
were being implemented at their agency and their level of preparedness. Burruss, Giblin,
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and Schafer (2010) measured preparedness by asking the agencies to indicate the
common actions their agencies had taken after September 11, 2001. For the purpose of
this study, preparedness was measured through a series of questions regarding actions
taken to increase terrorism preparedness. The surveyed agencies were asked a range of
questions from whether their agency had implemented any specialized units, scheduled
counterterrorism training, and the agency’s perceived level of preparedness on different
resources. The dependent variable was coded by creating two summed indexes of
preparedness, resources (Schafer, Burruss, & Giblin, 2009) and training (Burruss, Giblin,
& Schafer, 2010), of the responses received from the agencies. The resources index
included questions about the agency’s level of preparedness on the following: partnership
with other local responders, ability to communicate with other agencies, written
emergency response plan, training to respond to emergencies, level of preparedness for
large-scale incidents, knowledge and expertise about emergency response, equipment to
respond to emergencies, and budget to support emergency operations. The training index
asked participants if they implemented the following since September 11th: created
specialized units, created an internal task force, assigned individuals to address
emergency preparedness, increased number of staff dedicated to emergency
preparedness, scheduled training for terrorism related incidents, trained personnel on
emergency response, identified training opportunities, participated in field training
exercises, and participated in table-top exercises.
Independent Variable(s)
The first measure, for state of fit, was organizational structure, which was defined
as a hierarchical system that creates lines of authority, communication and duties within
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the organization. For the purpose of this study, organizational structure was measured by
two variables, structural complexity and formalization. Structural complexity was made
up of two components, horizontal differentiation, and vertical differentiation (Wells,
Falcone, & Rabe-Hemp, 2003). In the present study, the horizontal differentiation
variable was measured by the number of divisions or bureaus the police agency has
created. The number of ranks within the police agency measured the variable vertical
differentiation. The variable structural complexity was coded by coding vertical and
horizontal differentiation variable separately. Vertical differentiation was coded as the
number of ranks. The higher the number of ranks, the higher assumed complexity.
Horizontal differentiation was coded as 0-3 divisions/bureaus = 1, 4-7 divisions/bureaus
= 2, and 8 or more divisions = 3. The higher number of established divisions/bureaus, the
higher implied complexity of the agency. The two variables could have been combined to
code for structural complexity together but in order to ensure the measures are truly
measuring the same concept; the variables were coded separately.
Formalization is the existence of policies that control operations and procedures
within an organization. These policies control multiple aspects of law enforcement
agencies in assisting and constraining an officer’s actions during the course of duty. In
the survey, respondents were asked to identify, of the four policies listed, if they have
formally implemented them within their agency. The respondents were asked if they have
formal policies on the following: hostage situations, use of force, racial profiling, and
citizen complaints. These four formalization variables were chosen using items from a
Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey (Bureau
of Justice Statistics, 2007). The variable formalization was coded as 0=No, and 1=Yes of
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whether the agencies had these policies in place. These variables were combined into a
single index for analysis.
The second independent variable was police population ratio. For the purpose of
this study, police population ratio was used to address the measure of the organizational
size component of the contingency theory framework. Police population ratio was
defined as the ratio of sworn full time officers to the population. For the purpose of this
study, the number of sworn full time officers divided by the population multiplied by one
thousand was assessed to measure the variable police population ratio. Police agency
administrators were asked on the survey to provide their agency’s demographics in terms
of the number of full time sworn officers and citizen population in which they serve.
The third independent variable that was assessed in the study was risk. Risk was
defined as the likelihood of a perceived terrorist threat. The risk variable was measured
by asking law enforcement administrators whether their agency perceived the likelihood
of a terrorist threat occurring within their jurisdiction. Administrators were asked to
answer the survey question that pertained to the variable risk was answered through yes
or no option.
Finally, the last independent variable was funding. Funding has become a vital
part in assisting law enforcement agencies in terrorism prevention (Newman & Clarke,
2008). The Department of Homeland Security has awarded billions of dollars in grants to
law enforcement agencies for terrorism prevention (Becker & Schulz, 2011). For the
purpose of this study, funding was defined as monetary income from internal or external
sources. Funding was measured by asking police administrators to indicate how much
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their agency received for terrorism preparedness. The funding variable was then coded as
0 = no funding, and 1 = yes funding.
Data Collection
This study was a cross sectional, non-experimental design. Nine hundred and two
law enforcement agencies were surveyed about terrorism preparedness and police
technologies across 5 states. The study looked at information at one point in time. The
law enforcement agencies were surveyed using Illinois State University’s in-house survey
software, Select Survey. The agencies received a postcard asking for their participation in
the survey. The postcard had the unique survey website listed. Within days, an email was
sent to the agencies’ email addresses reminding them to take the survey. The link to the
survey was listed in the email as well. In the present study, the responses were
confidential meaning that every attempt was made to ensure that survey responses could
not be linked to the agencies. In order to ensure a decent return rate on the surveys, the
380 law enforcement agencies that did not have readily available email addresses were
sent a physical copy of the survey.
Research has shown that preparedness is important to law enforcement agencies
across the United States. Henry (2002) mentioned that the law enforcement mindset was
shifting to include “the notion of fighting and educating police officers about terrorist
practices, methods, and activities” (p. 325). However, not all law enforcement agencies
were shifting the resources to become better prepared for a terrorist attack. Riley and
Hoffman (1995) found that 38 percent of their surveyed law enforcement agencies had
some type of terrorism contingency plan in place. Pelfrey (2010) found that only 37
percent of police agencies actually conducted scenario training. Was this because of the
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lack of funding, resources, and the number of personnel? It is believed that law
enforcement agencies across the nation are attempting to become more active in terrorism
preparedness. Can contingency theory help explain terrorism preparedness? Contingency
theory has gained a great amount of support in explaining homeland security
preparedness (Davis et al. 2004; Davis et al., 2006; Schafer, Burruss, & Giblin, 2009;
Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010). The current study looked to confirm past research on
the relationship between risk and terrorism preparedness by looking at county and
municipal agencies, while determining whether contingency theory (agency size,
organizational structure, and contingency) played a vital role in explaining whether law
enforcement agencies were prepared for the next terrorist attack. The next chapter will
discuss the results of the current study.
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS
Introduction
Following September 11th, researchers have attempted to understand terrorism
preparedness among law enforcement agencies across the nation. Previous studies have
confirmed that risk is associated with preparedness (Davis et al., 2004; Davis et al., 2006;
Burruss, Giblin, & Schaefer, 2010; Giblin, Burruss, & Schafer, 2014), but has not
examined how agency characteristics impact preparedness. The present study was
designed to confirm and extend previous terrorism research by answering the following
research questions: (1) Do municipal and county police agencies believe they have the
necessary resources and training to prevent and or respond to the next terrorist attack?;
(2) How does agency size, structure, funding, and perceived risk influence terrorism
preparedness?
In this chapter, three different statistical analyses were used to test the relationship
between preparedness, size, structure, funding, and perceived risk. First, descriptive
statistics were run for all dependent and independent variables. Second, bivariate analysis
was used to test the relationships between the dependent and independent variables.
Ordinal Least Squares (OLS) regression analyses were used to evaluate the impact the
independent variables had on preparedness. Multicollinearity diagnostics were employed
to measure Variable Inflation Factor (VIF) and tolerance statistics to ensure that all the
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assumptions of the regression analysis were met. At the end of this chapter, a summary of
the statistical results were presented.
Descriptive Statistics
The dependent variable for this study was preparedness. Preparedness consisted
of two summed indexes, resources (x=28.39, SD= 5.45) and training (x= 3.85, SD= 2.23).
The indexes consisted of multiple questions regarding resources of an agency as well as
type of training and personnel staffed, (See Table 1).
The first index, resources, consisted of eight questions measured originally at the
ordinal-interval level through a Likert scale ranging from 1= very poor to 5=very good
regarding: budget to support emergency operations, communication with other agencies,
emergency response plan, equipment, knowledge and expertise, large-scale incident
preparedness, partnership with local responders, and training to respond to emergencies,
were summed into an index. These factors were analyzed by conducting a factor analysis
with Varimax rotation. The analysis yielded one factor which explained 54 percent of the
variance (Eigenvalue = 4.35).
Table 1 presented the results of the descriptive statistics. Agencies felt they had a
poor level of preparedness when dealing with a budget to support emergency operations
(x=2.31, SD=0.99). On average, law enforcement agencies felt they had a good
communication with other agencies (x=4.33, SD= 0.76). Written emergency response
plan had a mean value of 3.75 (SD= 0.99). Of the surveyed agencies, on average, felt
that their preparedness level was poor to fair in terms of having the proper equipment to
respond to emergencies (x=2.96, SD=0.99). Agencies’ knowledge and expertise about
emergency response was fair with a mean value of 3.81 (SD= 0.87). Law enforcement
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agencies’ felt their level of preparedness of large-scale incidents were fair (x=3.19,
SD=0.97). Agencies also reported that they had a good level of preparedness in terms of a
partnership with local responders (x= 4.41, SD=0.82). Agencies’ training preparedness
level was fair with a mean value of 3.77 (SD=0.91).
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Variables
Preparedness (Index)
Resources
Budget to support emergency
operations
Ability to Communicate w/other
agencies
Written Emergency Response plan
Equipment to respond to
emergencies
Knowledge and Expertise about
emergency response
Level of preparedness for LargeScale Incidents
Partnership W/local responders
Training to respond to emergencies
Training/Personnel (Index)
Participated in Field Training
Exercises
Assigned individuals to address
emergency preparedness
Created an internal task force
Created Specialized Units
Increased number of staff
dedicated to emergency
preparedness
Participated in table-top training
exercises
Trained personnel on emergency
response
Identified training opportunities
Scheduled training for terrorism
related incidents
Structural Complexity
Number of Bureaus/Divisions
(Horizontal)
Number of rank levels (Vertical)
Formalization (Index)
Police Population Ratio
Risk
Funding

n

Mean

SD

Min

Max

108
107

28.39
2.31

5.45
0.99

13.00
1

39.00
5

108

4.33

0.76

2

5

107

3.75

0.99

2

5

108

2.96

0.99

1

5

108

3.81

0.87

1

5

108

3.19

0.97

1

5

107
107
110
110

4.41
3.77
3.85
0.64

0.82
0.91
2.23
0.48

1
1
0
0

5
5
9
1

110

0.47

0.50

0

1

109
110
110

0.03
0.11
0.11

0.16
0.31
0.31

0
0
0

1
1
1

109

0.66

0.48

0

1

110

0.78

0.42

0

1

109
109

0.56
0.51

0.50
0.50

0
0

1
1

103

1.11

0.67

.00

3.00

104
104
101
113
99

3.88
3.23
1.25
0.14
0.11

1.99
1.02
0.95
0.35
0.31

0
.00
.00
0
.00

10
4.00
6.67
1
1.00
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The second index of the preparedness variable was training/personnel. The
category consisted of nine questions regarding: participation in field training exercises,
individuals assigned to address emergency preparedness, created an internal task force,
created specialized units, increased the number of personnel dedicated to emergency
preparedness, table-top training, training opportunities, and scheduling training for
terrorism related incidents. The questions were measured through yes (1) or no (0)
responses. The variables were factor analyzed using factor analysis with Varimax
rotation. The analysis initially yielded two factors. Once analyzing the factor loadings,
three variables: created an internal task force, created specialized units, and increased
number of personnel dedicated to emergency preparedness, were removed from the index
for the multivariate analyses. The factor analysis was conducted again in which it
produced one factor that explained 46 percent of the variance (Eigenvalue = 2.74).
The mean value for whether an agency participated in field training exercises was
0.64 (SD= 0.48). Individuals who were assigned to address emergency preparedness had
a mean value of 0.47 (SD= 0.50). On average agencies did not create an internal task
force (x= 0.03, SD= 0.16). Many of the surveyed agencies did not create specialized units
(x= 0.11, SD=0.31). Law enforcement agencies, on average, did not increase the number
of staff dedicated to emergency preparedness (x=0.11, SD=0.31) (See Table 1). Agencies
that participated in table-top training exercises had a mean value of 0.66 (SD=0.48). On
average, agencies were more likely to train personnel on emergency response (x=0.78,
SD=0.42). Of the surveyed agencies just over half conveyed that they had identified
training opportunities (x=0.56, SD=0.50). Agencies who had scheduled training for
terrorism related incidents had a mean value of 0.51 (SD=0.50).
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For measuring the influence of terrorism preparedness, five independent variables
were examined: structural complexity, formalization, police population ratio, risk, and
funding. First, structural complexity was measured by the number of bureaus or divisions
an agency had (x=1.11, SD=0.67) along with the number of rank levels within the agency
(x=3.88, SD=1.99). Second, formalization was measured by whether an agency had
policies on use of force (x=0.97, SD= 0.17), racial profiling (x=0.78, SD=0.42), citizen
complaints (x=0.87, SD=0.33), and hostage situations (x=0.63, SD=0.49). These
variables were first analyzed using the factor analysis with Varimax rotation. The
analysis produced one factor explaining 50 percent of the variance (Eigenvalue = 2.00).
Next, a summed formalization index was created, with a mean value of 3.23 (SD=1.02).
Across the surveyed agencies, on average the agencies had implemented the above
policies. Next, police population ratio was measured by the number of full time sworn
officers divided by the population times one thousand (x=1.25, SD=0.95). Overall, police
population ratio indicates that there is at least one full time officer per one thousand
citizens served. Risk was measured by whether an agency perceived the likelihood of a
terrorist threat occurring within their jurisdiction (x=0.14, SD= 0.35). Finally, funding
was measured in US dollars but was coded to become a dichotomous variable and had a
mean value of 0.11 (SD= 0.31).
In response to the second research question, table 2 shows the frequencies for the
resources variable. It was evident that of the responding agencies they felt most confident
in their level of preparedness with their partnerships (n=60, 56.1%) and communication
with other agencies (n=53, 49.1%) as many responded with 5-point ratings. This was
consistent with the findings of Schaefer, Burruss, and Giblin (2009). On the other hand,
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41.1 percent (n=44) of the agencies were not confident in their emergency operations
budget. Agencies rated themselves as having a fair level of preparedness for large-scale
incidents (n=46, 42.6%) along with having the necessary equipment to respond to
emergencies (n=46, 42.6%). This was an improvement from Schaefer, Burruss, and
Giblin’s (2009) finding of agencies ranking themselves less-than-adequate in terms of
having the necessary equipment for emergency operations. Law enforcement agencies
rated themselves as having a good level of knowledge and expertise about emergency
response (n=51, 47.2%). This could be explained bythe fact that many agencies felt that
they have a good preparedness level when dealing with training to respond to
emergencies (n=45, 42.1%). Forty-four agencies reported having a good level of
preparedness in terms of having a written emergency response plan in place (41.1%).
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Table 2
Frequencies for Resources Variable
Percentages of Agencies
Aspect of Response as…
n

(1)
Very Poor

(2)
Poor

(3)
Fair

(4)
Good

(5)
Very
Good

Partnership with other local
responders

107

1.9
(2)

0.9
(1)

7.5
(8)

33.6
(36)

56.1
(60)

Ability to communicate with
other agencies

108

0.0
(0)

1.9
(2)

12.0
(13)

37.0
(40)

49.1
(53)

Written Emergency Response
Plan

107

0.0
(0)

15.0
(16)

19.6
(21)

41.1
(44)

24.3
(26)

Training to Respond to
Emergencies

107

1.9
(2)

4.7
(5)

29.9
(32)

42.1
(45)

21.5
(23)

Level of Preparedness for LargeScale Incidents

108

5.6
(6)

14.8
(16)

42.6
(46)

29.6
(32)

7.4
(8)

Knowledge and Expertise about
Emergency Response

108

1.9
(2)

3.7
(4)

26.9
(29)

47.2
(51)

20.4
(22)

Equipment to Respond to
Emergencies

108

9.3
(10)

18.5
(20)

42.6
(46)

25.9
(28)

3.7
(4)

Budget to Support Emergency
Operations

107

21.5
(23)

41.1
(44)

24.3
(26)

11.2
(12)

1.9
(2)

Table 3 shows the percentages of agencies responding to questions within the
training/personnel variable. Of the 110 agencies that responded to whether their agency
had created specialized units, 98 agencies had not created specialized units at the time of
the survey (89.1%). This lack of implementation could have been due to budget restraints
as well as available personnel. As noted in table 3, many agencies stated that they did not
have an adequate budget to support emergency operations. Of the reporting agencies,
97.2 percent of them did not form an internal task force (n=106). About half the agencies
responding did assign individuals in their department to oversee and address emergency
preparedness (n=58, 52.7%). However, there were 52 agencies that did allocate personnel
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to address preparedness (47.3%). The data also showed that law enforcement agencies
were not likely to increase the number of staff dedicated to emergency preparedness
(n=98, 89.1%). It was found that 51.4 percent of agencies scheduled some type of
training for terrorism related incidents (n=56) while 48.6 percent did not attempt to
schedule training (n=53). In contrast to the lack of individuals assigned to address
emergency response, an overwhelmingly majority of agencies had trained personnel in
emergency response within their department (n=86, 78.2%). Fifty-six percent of the
responding departments confirmed that they had identified training opportunities (n=61).
When it came to training, 63.6 percent of agencies participated in field training exercises
(n=70) while 66.1 percent participated in table-top exercises (n=72) respectfully.
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Table 3
Frequencies for Training Variable
Since September 11th have you:
Created specialized units

n
110

Percentage of Agencies
Answering…
Yes
No
10.9
89.1
(12)
(98)

Created an internal task force

109

2.8
(3)

97.2
(106)

Assigned individuals to address emergency
preparedness

110

47.3
(52)

52.7
(58)

Increased number of staff dedicated to emergency
preparedness

110

10.9
(12)

89.1
(98)

Scheduled training for terrorism related incidents

109

51.4
(56)

48.6
(53)

Trained personnel on emergency response

110

78.2
(86)

21.8
(24)

Identified training opportunities

109

56.0
(61)

44.0
(48)

Participated in field training exercises

110

63.6
(70)

36.4
(40)

Participated in table-top exercises

109

66.1
(72)

33.9
(37)

Bivariate Analysis
Using correlations, a bivariate analysis was conducted to determine significant
relationships among the variables. Of the independent variables, four variables had a
significant association with the dependent variable, preparedness (training): formalization
(r =.370, p<.01), number of rank levels (r =.587, p<.01), number of divisions/bureaus (r
=.419, p<.01), and funding (r = .337, p<.01) There were four independent variables with
a significant association with preparedness (resources): formalization (r =.342, p<.01),
funding (r =.356, p<.01), number of rank levels (r =.371, p<.01), and number of
divisions/bureaus (r =.300, p<.01) (See Table 4).
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Table 4 also shows correlations among four independent variables. The Pearson
correlation coefficient showed that number of divisions/bureaus and police population
ratio had a significant but a negative weak relationship, (r = -.209, p<.05). The number of
divisions/bureaus was positively associated with formalization (r = .368, p<.01). Risk
was shown to have a weak but positive correlation with the number of divisions/bureaus,
(r = .201, p<.01). The number of rank levels was shown to have a positive, moderate
relationship with the number of divisions/bureaus (r =.566, p<.01). Risk was found to
have a weak but positive relationship with the number of rank levels (r = .214, p<.05).
The number of rank levels was also found to have weak, significant relationships with
formalization (r = .282, p<.01) and funding (r = .367, p<.01). Table 4 also indicated that
funding had a positive yet weak relationship to the number of divisions (r = .304, p<.01)
and risk (r =.225, p<.05).
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Table 4
Correlation Matrix for Variables
1
1. Preparedness (Training)

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1
.531**

1

3. Number of Rank Levels

.587**

.371**

1

4. Formalization

.370**

.342**

.283**

1

5. Funding

.337**

.356**

.367**

.104

1

6. Number of Divisions/Bureaus

.419**

.300**

.566**

.368**

.304**

1

7. Risk

.174

.006

.214*

.085

.225*

.201*

1

8. Police Population Ratio

-.099

-.190

-.178

.017

-.090

-.209*

-.101
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2. Preparedness (Resources)

**p<.01, *p<.05

1

Multicollinearity Diagnostics
Before running the OLS regression analysis, frequencies and distributions were
checked for all the variables. After checking the frequencies and distributions, the
regression analysis was conducted. To answer research question two, two separate
regression models had to be run due to the dependent variable consisting of two summed
indexes. For each dependent variable multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity,
autocorrelation, and normal distribution were examined to ensure regression assumptions
were met.
Multicollinearity occurs when variables are highly correlated with each other.
This can cause the decrease of explanation of the independent and dependent variables by
lowering the R2. There are multiple ways to examine multicollinearity. One way to check
this was by observing the correlation matrix on the regression output. If the bivariate
correlation was too high, it would have been above 0.70. In terms of the current study
none of the correlations reached 0.70. The highest correlation was .58. Another way to
check for multicollinearity was to inspect the collinearity diagnostics that SPSS supplies
on the regression output. Table 5 presents the results from the multicollinearity
diagnostics.
Table 5
Multicollinearity Diagnostics
Variables
Funding
Divisions
Formalization
Police Population Ratio
Rank Levels
Risk

Tolerance
.82
.55
.82
.93
.62
.90
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VIF
1.23
1.81
1.23
1.08
1.62
1.11

If multicollinearity existed, the tolerance would have approach zero. As can be
seen in table 5, no multicollinearity exists. The last way to check for multicollinearity
was by observing the VIF. If the VIF approached 2.0 or higher, there was a model
problem and multicollinearity was present. The current study variables had a range of
VIF from 1.08 to 1.81 as seen in table 5. This suggested that there was an absence of
multicollinearity in the present variables.
Heteroscedasticity was tested by conducting the Time Honored Method of
Inspection (THMI). The THMI was analyzed for a funneling effect on the scatter plot.
The results showed that the width of the band was mostly uniform from end to end with
no funneling effect detected. In order to test for autocorrelation, the Durbin-Watson
statistic was conducted. When the Durbin-Watson statistic approaches 2.0 it generally
indicates that the variable was independent. The Durbin-Watson associated with the
current study was 1.75 and 1.96 respectively. This suggests that there was no
autocorrelation. A Normal P-Plot was conducted to establish that the variables were
normally distributed. The closer the plot was to the line, the better. The P-Plot for this
study was very close to the line. This indicated that the variables were normally
distributed. Cook’s D, DFFITS, and DFBETAS were checked to ensure they did not
exceed one. There were no variables that did not exceed one. Therefore, it was
determined that outliers were not a major problem in the regression analysis.
Multivariate Analysis
In the OLS Regression, a multivariate analysis, two models were included to test
the statistical effect of funding, formalization, number of divisions, police population
ratio, number of rank levels, and risk on preparedness (resources and training). In Model
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1 examined the effect of funding, divisions/bureaus, formalization, police population
ratio, rank levels, and risk had on preparedness (training). In Model 2 the same variables
were tested for their influence on preparedness (resources).
Table 6
Results of Training OLS Regression Analysis
Variables
Preparedness (Training)
Constant
Funding
Divisions/Bureaus
Formalization
Police Population Ratio
Rank Levels
Risk
Note. R2 = .40, n = 91
**p < .01, *p < .05

B

SE

β

p

.34
.88
.08
.46
.02
.45
.10

.66
.57
.31
.19
.17
.11
.50

.15
.03
.22
.01
.45
.02

.127
.808
.020*
.926
.000**
.839

Table 6 presented the results of the training OLS Regression analysis. Two
variables were significant in predicting the dependent variable. The first variable that was
a significant predictor was formalization (β=.22, p<.05). Essentially, agencies that had
policies (formalization) implemented were more likely to believe that they would be
prepared than agencies that did not have policies in place. The strongest predictor of
training was number of rank levels (β=.45, p< .01). The more rank levels an agency had,
the more likely an agency perceived that they would be prepared for a terrorist attack.
Lastly, the model was found to be statistically significant and explained 40 percent of the
variance (R2=.40, n=91) (See table 6).
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Table 7
Results of Resources OLS Regression Analysis
Variables
Constant
Funding
Divisions/Bureaus
Formalization
Police Population Ratio
Rank Levels
Risk
Note. R2 = .26, n=91
**p < .01, *p < .05, ap < .10

B
24.78
5.45
.70
.71
-.63
.34
-2.77

SE
1.96
1.68
.92
.57
.50
.32
1.47

β

p

.34
.10
.13
-.12
.13
-.19

.002**
.450
.218
.215
.284
.064a

Table 7 presents the Resources OLS Regression analysis. There was only one
statistically significant predictor of preparedness. Funding (β=.34, p< .01) was found to
be the strongest predictor. Law enforcement agencies that had funding for
counterterrorism operations were more likely to have the necessary resources for
terrorism preparedness. Risk (β=-.19, p< .10) was a marginally significant predictor of
preparedness (resources). However, the model was found to be statistically significant as
it explained 26 percent of the variance (R2=.26, n=91) (See table 7).
Conclusion
In this chapter, several analyses were utilized in which they presented important
predictors of the dependent variable, preparedness. First, the bivariate correlations found
statistically significant relationships among the variables. Second, the assumption of the
regression equation were tested and confirmed. The VIF and tolerance scores showed no
multicollinearity issues. Finally, the OLS regression was used to establish the impact the
independent variables had on preparedness. Formalization and the number of rank levels
were found to have a positive effect on the preparedness (training). In the second model,
funding was the only variable to have a positive effect on preparedness (resources). On
the other hand, risk had a negative effect on preparedness (resources). In the next chapter,
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the findings from the present study are discussed in greater detail along with implications
and limitations of the study.

59

CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION
Introduction
Law enforcement agencies today play a vital role in terrorism prevention. There
are many factors in understanding terrorism preparedness among law enforcement
agencies. In past research, risk has been identified as the leading factor in driving
terrorism preparedness (Davis et al. 2004; Davis, Mariano, Pace, Cotton, & Steinberg,
2006; Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010; Giblin, Burruss, & Schafer, 2014). For example,
Giblin, Burruss, and Schafer (2014) found that “agency leaders who perceive their risk to
be higher…are more likely to take steps to enhance their preparedness” (p.46). On the
other hand, institutional influences have also been found to play a role in terrorism
prevention (Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010). Burruss, Giblin, and Schaefer (2010)
found that the “influence of professional publications, associations, and peers
[institutional pressures] were strongly related with greater levels of homeland security
preparedness” (p.96). The contingency theory asserts that an organization adapts to their
environment through organizational structure and contingencies in order to remain a high
level of performance (Donaldson, 2007). The current thesis looked to assess the state of
fit within law enforcement agencies and to identify any trends within the region surveyed.
Utilizing the contingency theory as a framework, the current study expanded on
current research of terrorism preparedness by conducting an exploratory analysis to
answer the following questions: (1) Do municipal and county police agencies believe
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they have the necessary resources and training to prevent and or respond to the next
terrorist attack? (2) How does agency size, structure, funding, and perceived risk
influence terrorism preparedness? To answer these research questions, bivariate and
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression analyses were employed. The statistical results
and their implications are discussed below.
Discussion
This study confirmed and extended previous research on terrorism preparedness
in law enforcement agencies. One major finding of the current study was that risk was a
predictor of preparedness. Although risk was significant, it was a weak predictor of
preparedness compared to previous studies. Another finding of the study was that
contingency theory did assist in exploring terrorism preparedness, as organizational
structure and contingencies drove preparedness.
According to Schafer, Burruss, and Giblin (2009), most law enforcement agencies
were confident in their communication and partnership capacities. The current results
confirm this finding. In other words, law enforcement agencies reported having a very
good open line of communication and partnerships with outside agencies. In past
terrorism literature, communication and cooperation with outside agencies was reported
as a struggle or nonexistent. Downing (2009) claimed there were “turf battles and need
for jurisdictional supremacy at all levels of the U.S. law enforcement community” (p.3).
As Schafer, Burruss, and Giblin’s (2009) finding and the current study’s finding,
communication and cooperation have greatly improved.
For an agency to have a good level of terrorism preparedness, one component is
essential, equipment. According to Schafer, Burruss, and Giblin (2009), more than half of
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the agencies surveyed responded with “less-than-adequate” equipment for emergency
operations. The current thesis found that of the agencies surveyed, close to half
communicated that they had a ‘fair’ level of preparedness in terms of equipment needed
for emergency operations. This was an improvement from Schafer, Burruss, and Giblin’s
(2009) findings.
Research in the past has identified risk as a predictive factor in determining
terrorism preparedness among law enforcement agencies (Davis et al. 2004; Davis,
Mariano, Pace, Cotton, & Steinberg, 2006; Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010; Giblin,
Burruss, & Schafer, 2014). The data from the current study suggested that risk had a
negative effect on terrorism preparedness. However, in the current thesis, risk proved to
be a marginally significant predictor of terrorism preparedness. One reason for this result
may lie with pressures facing the agency. According to Haynes and Giblin (2014), all
agencies face some type of pressure to address homeland security tasks. For example, law
enforcement agencies face the pressure to take on homeland security obligations, but
additional pressures (i.e., funding, organizational structure, etc.) may hinder them from
addressing homeland security concerns in a timely manner. Another possible reason that
risk was a weak predictor could have been due to the small sample size. Overall, the
number of useable cases for this study was around 115. A larger sample may have
produced more robust findings.
In the current study, funding was a predictor of resources. This finding was
consistent with what one would expect, agencies were increasing their budget to increase
the resources they can acquire. This confirms Davis et al.’s (2004) finding that funding is
related to preparedness. According to Davis et al. (2004), when there is an increase of
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external funding law enforcement agencies are more likely to increase their resources to
focus on terrorism preparedness. On the other hand, Burruss et al. (2010) stated that
agencies “did not appear to be adopting practices in response to the lure of external
funding” (p.95). The current data suggested that law enforcement agencies were adopting
practices in response to the amount of funding they receive for counterterrorism
operations. The increase in funding could have been due to the amount of
counterterrorism grants being issued to law enforcement agencies since September 11th.
In 2011 alone, the DHS awarded over $2 billion in counterterrorism grants (Becker &
Schulz, 2011). Overall, a law enforcement agency that received external funding for
counterterrorism were more likely to focus on resources for terrorism preparedness than
those who do not.
Contingency theory states that an organization adapts to its environment to
accomplish a fit between structure and contingencies. For the purpose of this study,
structure was measured by structural complexity (i.e., number of ranks and number of
divisions/bureaus) and formalization (i.e., policies). Donaldson (2007) claimed that
organizations strive to be fit so they can enjoy a high level of performance. In the current
thesis, findings suggested that the variables formalization and number of rank levels had
a positive effect on training. This means the more policies an agency implemented the
more likely they focused on training opportunities for their personnel. Also, the more
rank levels a law enforcement agency had, the more likely the agency provided
counterterrorism training for their employees. As stated before, contingency theory
hinges on the balance of organizational structure (i.e., formalization & diversification)
and its contingencies (i.e., organizational size, diversification, risk, funding) in order for
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an organization to retain a high performance (i.e., preparedness). The current findings
suggested that contingency theory was a good framework for exploring terrorism
preparedness. The data from the current study showed that the organizational structure
component of contingency theory did drive training, which was a component of the
dependent variable, preparedness. On the other side, risk and funding, contingency
components of the theory, were shown to drive resources of the dependent variable.
Therefore it could be concluded that contingency theory explained terrorism preparedness
among law enforcement agencies, confirming past research (Davis et al., 2004, 2006;
Schaefer, Burruss, & Giblin, 2009; Burruss et al., 2010).
Limitations
The study’s findings should be interpreted with the following limitations in mind.
First, not all law enforcement agencies have a readily available email address for public
consumption. This became a problem as the surveys were intended to be electronic. Of
the original 902 agencies selected for the study, only 522 agencies had public email
addresses. The remaining 380 agencies without an email address were mailed a paper
copy of the survey.
Second, there were time constraints with this study. The survey was live only for
a few months. It would have been ideal to have the survey live for at least 4 to 5 months
before closing it for analysis. Third, there was a small return rate on the surveys. The
researcher only had 115 usable cases for analysis out of the original 902 sample size. This
gave the researcher a 12.74 percent return rate. Fourth, due to the small return rate and
the lack of the bigger law enforcement agency respondents, generalizability cannot be
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established. Finally, of the responding agencies, not all of the data received was
complete. This was because agencies could to skip questions they did not want to answer.
Implications and Conclusion
Based on the findings of the current thesis a handful of implications can be drawn.
First, law enforcement agencies felt they have a good level of terrorism preparedness
given the resources they were able to acquire. Overall, this meant that agencies were able
to obtain the necessary counterterrorism resources they needed to be prepared. Second,
although agencies were locating resources, their organizations were not implementing a
large number of training opportunities for their officers. Just over half of the agencies had
scheduled training for terrorism related incidents. However, this finding shows that
agencies were attempting to move in the direction of acquiring a higher level of terrorism
preparedness. In answering the first research question, law enforcement agencies believe
they have enough training and resources to respond and or prevent the next terrorist
attack.
Next, based on the results of the current study, risk and funding drive whether an
agency was able to obtain the necessary resources. Also, formalization and a portion of
the structural complexity drives whether an agency attained counterterrorism training.
Overall, contingency theory helped explain terrorism preparedness among law
enforcement agencies. This finding confirmed previous studies stating that contingency
theory assists in explaining homeland security preparedness (Davis et al. 2004, 2006;
Schafer, Burruss, & Giblin, 2009; Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010). Finally, in
answering the second research question, agency size did not influence terrorism
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preparedness. However, perceived risk, funding and structure were found to have an
influence on the level of preparedness.
The current study found that law enforcement agencies’ level of preparedness was
driven by risk, funding, formalization, and the number of rank levels. However, agencies
felt their level of preparedness with acquiring the necessary equipment needed for
emergency operations was fair. It was concluded that law enforcement agencies believed
they had the necessary resources and training to prevent and/or respond to a terrorist
attack. The current results concluded that the theoretical framework helps explain
terrorism preparedness. Future researchers should continue examining terrorism
preparedness through the training and resources variables. More specifically, researchers
should examine more specific influential factors that drive an agencies preparedness level
through qualitative research that can capture a more in-depth explanation of an agency’s
terrorism preparedness decisions.

66

REFERENCES
Baldwin, T. E., Ramaprasad, A., & Samsa, M. E. (2008). Understanding Public
Confidence in Government to Prevent Terrorist Attacks. Journal of Homeland
Security & Emergency Management, 5(1), 1-18.
Balko, R. (2013). Rise of the warrior cop: The militarization of America's police forces.
Public Affairs.
Becker, A., & Schulz, G.W. (2011). Local police stockpile high-tech, combat-ready gear.
Retrieved from http://cironline.org/reports/local-police-stockpile-high-techcombat-ready-gear-2913
Blau, P. M., & Schoenherr, R. A. (1971). The structure of organizations [by] Peter M.
Blau [and] Richard A. Schoenherr. New York, Basic Books.
Boulding, K. E. (1956). General systems theory-the skeleton of science. Management
science, 2(3), 197-208.
Brooks, B. E. (2010). Law Enforcement's Role in US Counterterrorism Strategy. Police
Journal, 83(2), 113-125. doi:10.1350/pojo.2010.83.2.480
Bureau of Justice Statistics. (2007). Law Enforcement Management and Administrative
Statistics: Sample Survey of Law Enforcement Agencies. Washington D.C.:
Bureau of Justice Statistics.
Burruss, G. W., Giblin, M. J., & Schafer, J. A. (2010). Threatened globally, acting
locally: Modeling law enforcement homeland security practices. Justice
Quarterly, 27(1), 77-101.
Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Development of a National
Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness: GAO-02-550T. (2002). GAO
Reports, 1.
Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations: GAO-01822. (2001). GAO Reports, 1.
Combs, C. C. (2013). Terrorism in the twenty-first century / Cindy C. Combs. Boston:
Pearson, 2013.
67

Council of State Governments. & Eastern Kentucky University. (2006). The Impact of
Terrorism on State Law Enforcement: Adjusting to New Roles and Changing
Conditions. U.S. Department of Justice.
Counter-Terrorism Training Coordination Working Group, & United States of America.
(2003). Counter-Terrorism Training Coordination Working Group, 2002 Annual
Report.
Crank, J. P., & Wells, L. E. (1991). The effects of size and urbanism on structure among
Illinois police departments. Justice Quarterly, 8(2), 169-185.
Davis, L. M. (2004). When terrorism hits home: how prepared are state and local law
enforcement? / Lois M. Davis ... [et al.]. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2004.
Davis, L. M., Mariano, L. T., Pace, J. E., Cotton, S. K., & Steinberg, P. (2006).
Combating Terrorism: How prepared are state and local response
Organizations? Rand Corporation.
Donaldson, L. (2001). The Contingency Theory of Organizations. Thousands Oaks, Calif.
: Sage Publications, c2001.
Downing, M. P. (2009). Policing Terrorism in the United States: The Los Angeles Police
Department's Convergence Strategy. The Police Chief, 76(2).
Else, D. H. (2014). The "1033 Program," Department of Defense Support to Law
Enforcement. Congressional Research Service: Report, 1.
Federal Bureau of Investigations. (n.d.). What We Investigate. Retrieved from
http://www.fbi.gov/albuquerque/about-us/what-we-investigate
Ganor, B. (2002). Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist another Man's Freedom
Fighter?. Police Practice & Research, 3(4), 287-304.
doi:10.1080/1561426022000032060
Giblin, M. J., Burruss, G. W., & Schafer, J. A. (2014). A Stone’s Throw from the
Metropolis: Re-Examining Small-Agency Homeland Security Practices. Justice
Quarterly, 31(2), 368-393.
Hatch, M. J., & Cunliffe, A. L. (2013). Organization Theory: Modern, Symbolic, and
Postmodern Perspectives / Mary Jo Hatch with Ann L. Cunliffe. Oxford, United
Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Haynes, M. R., & Giblin, M. J. (2014). Homeland security risk and preparedness in
police agencies: The insignificance of actual risk factors. Police Quarterly, 17(1),
30-53.
68

Henry, V. E. (2002). The Need for a Coordinated and Strategic Local Police Approach to
Terrorism: A Practitioner's Perspective. Police Practice & Research, 3(4), 319336. doi:10.1080/1561426022000032088
Hill, S., & Beger, R. (2009). A Paramilitary Policing Juggernaut. Social Justice, 36(1),
25-40.
Lambert, D. (2010). Intelligence-Led Policing in a Fusion Center. FBI Law Enforcement
Bulletin, 79(12), 1.
Langworthy,R. (1986). The Structure of Police Organizations. New York: Praeger.
Maguire, E.R. (2003). Organizational Structure in American Police Agencies: Context,
Complexity, and Control. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
National Public Safety Information (2015). National directory of law enforcement
administrators: Correctional institutions and related agencies. Retrieved from
http://www.safetysource.com/directories/index.cfm?fuseaction=displayReference
&ReferenceID=1
Newman, G. R., & Clarke, R. G. (2008). Policing terrorism [electronic resource]: an
executive's guide / by Graeme R. Newman and Ronald V. Clarke. Washington,
DC: U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services,
Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, [2008].
Ortiz, C. W., Hendricks, N. J., & Sugie, N. F. (2007). Policing Terrorism: The Response
of Local Police Agencies to Homeland Security Concerns. Criminal Justice
Studies, 20(2), 91-109. doi:10.1080/14786010701396830
Pelfrey, W. V. (2007). Local law enforcement terrorism prevention efforts: A state level
case study. Journal of Criminal Justice, 35(3), 313-321.
doi:10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2007.03.007
Protecting your Community from Terrorism [electronic resource: Strategies for Local
Law Enforcement. (2003). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Justice, Community
Oriented Policing Services, [2003-.
Rabe-Hemp, C. (2014). Lecture. Normal, ILL: Illinois State University.
Randol, B. M. (2013). An Exploratory Analysis of Terrorism Prevention and Response
Efforts in Municipal Police Departments in the United States: Which Agencies
Participate in Terrorism Prevention and Why?. Police Journal, 86(2), 158-181.
doi:10.1350/pojo.2013.86.2.618

69

Riley, K. J., & Hoffman, B. (1995). Domestic Terrorism: A National Assessment of State
and Local Preparedness / Kevin Jack Riley, Bruce Hoffman. Santa Monica, CA:
Rand Corp.
Schafer, J. A., Burruss, G. W., & Giblin, M. J. (2009). Measuring Homeland Security
Innovation in Small Municipal Agencies Policing in a Post—9/11 World. Police
Quarterly, 12(3), 263-288.
Schmid, A. P. & Jongman, A. J. (1988). Political terrorism: A new guide to actors,
authors, concepts, data bases, theories, and literature. Amsterdam; New York :
North-Holland ; New Brunswick, U.S.A. : Transaction Books, distributors for the
Western hemisphere, c1988.
Schreiber, S. (2008). Your role in terror preparedness. Law Enforcement Technology,
35(6), 48-54.
Shernock, S.K. (2009). Introduction to the Special Issue on Policing and Homeland
Security’ Criminal Justice and Behavior 36(12):1249– 58.
University of Maryland. (2014). Global Terrorism Database. Retrieved from
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly
=&start_year=2000&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2013&end_month=
12&end_day=31&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties
_type=b&casualties_max=
U.S. Census Bureau. (2015). State and County QuickFacts: Illinois. Retrieved from
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/17000.html
U.S. Census Bureau. (2015). State and County QuickFacts: Indiana. Retrieved from
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/18000.html
U.S. Census Bureau. (2015). State and County QuickFacts: Michigan. Retrieved from
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/26000.html
U.S. Census Bureau. (2015). State and County QuickFacts: Ohio. Retrieved from
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/39000.html
U.S. Census Bureau. (2015). State and County QuickFacts: Wisconsin. Retrieved from
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/55000.html
Van de Ven, A. H., & Drazin, R. (1984). The Concept of Fit in Contingency Theory (No.
SMRC-DP-19). MINNESOTA UNIV MINNEAPOLIS STRATEGIC
MANAGEMENT RESEARCH CENTER.

70

Vardalis, J. J., & Waters, S. N. (2010). An Analysis of Texas Sheriffs' Opinions
Concerning Domestic Terrorism: Training, Equipment, Funding and Perceptions
Regarding Likelihood of Attack. Journal of Homeland Security & Emergency
Management, 7(1), 1-15.
Wagers, M., (2012). Protecting the Homeland: Focusing on Prevention and State, Local,
and Tribal Law Enforcement. The Police Chief, 79, 20–21.
Wells, L. E., Falcone, D. N., & Rabe-Hemp, C. (2003). Community characteristics and
policing styles in suburban agencies. Policing: An International Journal of Police
Strategies & Management, 26(4), 566-590.
Woodward, J. (1965). Industrial Organizations: Theory and Practice. London: Oxford
University Press.
Zhao, J., Ren, L., & Lovrich, N. (2010). Police Organizational Structures During the
1990s: An Application of Contingency Theory. Police Quarterly, 13(2), 209-232.
doi:10.1177/1098611110365691

71

APPENDIX
LAW ENFORCEMENT PREPAREDNESS
SURVEY
Is it likely that you will have a terrorist attack within your jurisdiction in the next 5 years?
1 YES
2 NO
IF YES, which does your agency perceive as an immediate threat? (Circle all that apply)
1 CHEMICAL WARFARE
2 CYBER-TERRORISM
3 AGRO-TERRORISM (AGRICULTURE TERRORISM)
4 BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM
5 CONVENTIONAL EXPLOSIVES
6 RADIOLOGICAL THREATS
7 USE OF MILITARY WEAPONS
Since September 11th have you:
1 CREATED SPECIALIZED UNITS
2 CREATED AN INTERNAL TASK FORCE
3 ASSIGNED INDIVIDUALS TO ADDRESS EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS
4 INCREASED NUMBER OF STAFF DEDICATED TO EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS
5 SCHEDULED TRAINING FOR TERRORISM RELATED INCIDENTS
6 TRAINED PERSONNEL ON EMERGENCY RESPONSE
7 IDENTIFIED TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES
8 PARTICIPATED IN FIELD TRAINING EXERCISES
9 PARTICIPATED IN TABLE-TOP EXERCISES
10 NONE OF THE ABOVE
Please enter the number of officers in your agency trained in counterterrorism.
______________________ OFFICERS
Does your agency have an active cooperation with other agencies for the purpose of
terrorism-related operations?
1 YES
2 NO
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IF YES, what agencies do you actively cooperate with for the purpose of terrorismrelated operations?
1 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS (FBI)
2 LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
3 FUSIONS CENTERS
4 FIRE SERVICES
5 STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
6 EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES (EMS)
7 OTHER STATE AGENCIES
8 OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES
9 DO NOT HAVE ACTIVE COOPERATION WITH OUTSIDE
AGENCIES
Has your agency ever provided information to a fusion center?
1 YES
2 NO
Does your agency participate in the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)?
1 YES
2 NO
Does your agency have designated personnel to act as liaisons to other agencies on
counterterrorism issues?
1 YES
2 NO
How much money did your agency receive for counterterrorism operations (i.e., training,
equipment, personnel, etc.) last year?
$_____________________________
From your perspective of your agency, please rate your agency’s level of preparedness
for the following critical incident responses: (Circle your answers)
Partnership with other local responders:
VERY POOR

POOR

FAIR

GOOD

VERY GOOD

Ability to communication with other agencies:
VERY POOR

POOR

FAIR

GOOD

VERY GOOD

GOOD

VERY GOOD

Written emergency response plan:
VERY POOR

POOR

FAIR
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Training to respond to emergencies:
VERY POOR

POOR

FAIR

GOOD

VERY GOOD

Level of preparedness for large-scale incidents:
VERY POOR

POOR

FAIR

GOOD

VERY GOOD

Knowledge and expertise about emergency response:
VERY POOR

POOR

FAIR

GOOD

VERY GOOD

Equipment to respond to emergencies:
VERY POOR

POOR

FAIR

GOOD

VERY GOOD

Budget to support emergency operations:
VERY POOR

POOR

FAIR

GOOD
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VERY GOOD

Your Agency
How many sworn/nonsworn officers does your agency employ?
FULL TIME______________
Sworn Officers:
PART TIME______________
FULL TIME_______________
Nonsworn Officers:
PART TIME______________
How many rank levels (line officer, sergeant. Lieutenant, etc.) does your agency have?
__________________________________
How many divisions/bureaus does your agency have?
_________________________________
Roughly, how many citizens does your agency serve?
_________________________________
Would you describe your jurisdiction as primarily:
1 RURAL
2 SUBURBAN
3 URBAN
4 OTHER
PLEASE EXPLAIN: ____________________________________
Does your agency have a WRITTEN counterterrorism policy/plan?
1 YES
2 NO
Does your agency have formal policies on the following: (please circle your answer)
USE OF FORCE ………………………..
YES
NO
RACIAL PROFILING………………….
YES
NO
CITIZENS COMPLIANCE……………..
YES
NO
HOSTAGE SITUATIONS………………
YES
NO
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